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Progressivity and Flexibility in Developing  
an Effective Competition Regime:  
Using Experiences of Poland, Ukraine,  
and South Africa for developing countries 
Abstract 
The paper discusses the role of the concept of special and differential treatment in the 
framework of regional trade agreements for the development of a competition regime. 
After a discussion of the main characteristics and possible shortfalls of those concepts, 
three case countries are assessed in terms of their experience with progressivity, flexibil-
ity, and technical and financial assistance: Poland was led to align its competition laws 
to match the model of the EU. The Ukraine opted voluntarily for the European model, 
this despite its intense integration mainly with Russia. South Africa, a developing coun-
try that emerged from a highly segregated social fabric and an economy dominated by 
large conglomerates with concentrated ownership. All three countries enacted (or com-
prehensively reformed) their competition laws in an attempt to face the challenges of 
economic integration and catch up development on the one hand and particular social 
problems on the other. Hence, their experience may be pivotal for a variety of different 
developing countries who are in negotiations to include competition issues in regional 
trade agreements. The results suggest that the design of such competition issues have to 
reflect country-particularities to achieve an efficient competition regime. 
 
Keywords: Special and differential treatment, progressivity, flexibility, competition law 
JEL-classification: K20, K21, L40, L50, O20  
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Zusammenfassung 
Die Studie diskutiert die Bedeutung von ‘special and differential treatment’ im Rahmen 
von Freihandelsabkommen für die Entwicklung eines Wettbewerbsregimes. Zunächst 
werden die Entstehung und die Hauptbestandteile dieses Konzeptes kurz diskutiert. An-
schließend werden drei Länder – Polen, Ukraine und Südafrika – bezüglich dieses Kon-
zeptes bewertet. Polen mußte im Rahmen der Beitrittsverhandlungen zur Europäischen 
Union  das  Wettbewerbsregime  dem  der  Europäischen  Union  anpassen.  Die  Ukraine 
wählte freiwillig das Europäische Modell, trotz der engen Anbindung an Rußland. Mit 
Südafrika wird ein Entwicklungsland behandelt, dessen Gesellschaftssystem durch jahr-
zehntelange Rassentrennungspolitik beeinflußt wurde und heute noch durch eine hohe 
Konzentration  der  Wirtschaftsaktitivtät  gekennzeichnet  ist.  Alle  drei  Länder  haben 
jüngst ein Wettbewerbsgesetz eingeführt beziehungsweise reformiert, um den Heraus-
forderungen zunehmender wirtschaftlicher Integration, nachholender Entwicklung und 
gesellschaftlicher Probleme zu begegnen. Die Erfahrungen dieser Länder können ande-
ren Entwicklungsländern helfen, die angehalten sind, im Rahmen eines Freihandelsab-
kommens ein Wettbewerbsregime zu etablieren. 
 
Schlagworte: Wettbewerbsgesetz, special and differential treatment, flexibility, progres-
sivity 
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1  Introduction 
Up to now around 102 countries in the world have a competition legislation to foster 
competition within the economy. Most of these competition legislations are relatively 
new. Around 66% of the national competition legislations have been introduced after 
1990, whereby in particular transition and developing countries take the step to intro-
duce  their  first  competition  legislation,  whereas  developed  countries  normally  intro-
duced their competition legislation much earlier (Kronthaler and Stephan 2005, pp. 3-5). 
These figures indicate that in particular since the 1990s, the number of countries that 
have a competition law increased considerably, but it also shows that there are numer-
ous countries in the world that do not use this instrument to foster competition. Some of 
this proliferation of competition laws is related to regional bilateral and multilateral 
trade agreements with a view on securing the benefits from lower trade barriers and 
open borders which may potentially be undermined by anti-competitive practices with 
their possible knock-on effects in other jurisdictions (e.g. international cartels). 
The second important empirical observation is that despite enactment, countries often 
fall short of implementing this law effectively for several reasons, e.g. lack of competi-
tion culture, scare resources, lack of experience, bureaucratic and political resistance, 
etc. In this respect CUTS states that “enacting a competition law may not necessarily 
translate into an effective competition regime. It came out very clearly in the 7-Up pro-
ject that competition regimes in most of the countries selected therein are quite ineffec-
tive” (CUTS 2003b, p. 1). Furthermore, in a study by ICN, the point is made that “ca-
pacity building is a central challenge for the vast majority of the International Competi-
tion Network’s (ICN) members” (ICN 2005, p. 1). 
The objective of this paper is to examine how countries that participate in regional trade 
agreements with competition provisions can be assisted in enacting and in effectively 
implementing the competition provisions within agreements. Particular focus is placed 
in this respect to the role of the concepts of flexibility and progressivity and technical 
and financial assistance. Those concepts originate from Special and Differential Treat-
ment provisions within WTO agreements and are designed to provide the necessary pol-
icy-space needed by less developed partners in bilateral or multilateral trade agreements 
with competition provisions. This study builds predominantly on case studies for Po-
land, South Africa and Ukraine which were conducted in an EU-funded research project 
on Competition Policy. On this basis, the particularly important points within the three 
case countries with respect to flexibility and progressivity are discussed. When examin-
ing assistance, the available information on the effectiveness of financial and technical 
assistance provided in particular by ICN, OECD, UNCTAD is used to analyse whether 
the received assistance by the case countries is well targeted or not. 
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The first part of the paper discusses the roots and concepts of flexibility and progressiv-
ity and technical assistance. The following section discusses what we can infer from the 
case study experiences in terms of the role of those concepts during the processes of e-
nactment and revision of competition laws. A final section summarizes the findings and 
discusses political recommendations.  
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2  Discussion of special and differential treatment, and the de-
sign of technical and financial assistance 
In this section, we describe the concepts of special and differential treatment and review 
the role that flexibility and progressivity, and technical and financial assistance can po-
tentially play in the processes of enacting and more effectively enforcing competition 
regimes. 
2.1  Special and differential treatment in building an effective com-
petition regime: the concepts of flexibility and progressivity 
The concepts of flexibility and progressivity, and technical and financial assistance form 
part of a larger set of provisions in the framework of foreign trade agreements, termed 
“special and differential treatment”, and are in line with the so-called “preferential or 
differential treatment” in the UN Set of 1980.1 The original concept of special and dif-
ferential treatment was introduced within GATT in 1955 in the trade context to meet the 
concerns  of  developing  countries,  in  particular  that  the  core  principles  of  non-
discrimination and reciprocity do not correspond to their special needs for development. 
The rules aimed at enabling developing countries to become fully integrated in World 
trade. Up to the 1980s, the provisions on special and differential treatment were build 
around  two  core  concepts:  non-reciprocity  and  preferential  market  access.  Non-
reciprocity was designed to meet the needs of developing countries to protect domestic 
industries through establishing comparatively higher tariffs and trade barriers for im-
ports into developing countries than for developed countries. Preferential market access 
should enable development countries to foster exports to developed countries. 
However, in the 1980s, evidence increased that protection does not increase the com-
petitiveness of protected industries and that preferential market access does not function 
well either. In general, it has been increasingly noticed that the provisions around non-
reciprocity and preferential market access did not have the expected effect to foster de-
velopment countries within the international trading system (OECD 2003a, p. 16). To 
take this into account, procedural measures which are designed to allow developing 
countries to fulfil WTO obligations in a smoother way, became more important. 
Today, the WTO agreements comprise about 150 special and differential treatment pro-
visions, which are classified by WTO in six main categories (WTO 2001a, pp. 4-5): 
                                                 
1  In the following, the concepts of ‘special and differential treatment’ and ‘flexibility and progressiv-
ity’ with special regard to the competition concept are briefly discussed. For a more comprehensive 
discussion see e.g. Nottage (2003), Pangestu (2000), OECD (2001), OECD (2003a), OECD (2004), 
and WTO (2001a).  
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(i)  provisions  aimed  at  increasing  trade  opportunities  of  developing  country 
Members, 
(ii)  provisions under which WTO Members should safeguard the interests of de-
veloping country Members, 
(iii)  flexibility of commitments, of action, and use of policy instruments, 
(iv)  transitional time periods, 
(v)  technical assistance, 
(vi)  provisions relating to least-developed country Members. 
The first category consists of provisions which should increase the trade opportunities of 
developing countries. However, it is increasingly questioned whether these provisions in 
fact increase trade opportunities or not. The second class of provisions comprise actions 
by members to safeguard the interests of developing countries. Alike for the first cate-
gory, it is questionable to which extent these provisions in fact fulfil the intended objec-
tives. The provisions of the third group call for exemptions from commitments or a re-
duced level of commitments for developing country members to be accepted by devel-
oped members. This group allows in particular developing countries some flexibility in 
adopting agreements and in deciding which rules to apply. This proved to be especially 
important for facilitating the integration of trade policy in a wider range of developing 
interests. The fourth category includes time-restricted exceptions to facilitate the imple-
mentation and to take into account that the implementation of provisions needs time. 
The next set of provisions is designed to facilitate the implementation of agreements 
trough technical assistance, and is hence closely related to the fourth category of provi-
sions. The last group consist of provisions applicable only for least-developed countries 
and includes all provisions from the five categories listed before (WTO 2001a, pp. 6-10). 
Of the six types of provisions, the concepts of flexibility (type 3), transitional time peri-
ods (type 4), and technical assistance (type 5) have been considered as relevant within 
the trade and competition context, i.e. the context of considering competition issues 
within trade negotiations (OECD 2003a, p. 18).2 Those types of special and differential 
treatment,  when  extended  in  competition  clauses to  less-developed partners of trade 
agreements, are duly acknowledged in the UN Set of 1980 and match the types of provi-
sions that were included in specific Uruguay Round Agreements (Brusick and Clarke 
2005, p. 162). 
Within the trade and competition context, flexibility may be seen as a concept which 
grants developing countries the ability to adopt particular rules that address their spe-
                                                 
2  Flexibility and transitional time periods (or in other words progressivity) are discussed as the most 
important provisions on special and differential treatment within the trade and competition context. 
Both terms (flexibility and progressivity) are often used similar or instead of the broader special and 
differential treatment term.  
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cific particularities and needs (OECD 2003a p. 18 and WTO 2001b, p. 11), and to im-
plement exemptions and exclusions3 (OECD 2003b, p. 3), when developing their own 
competition regimes. It is hence more targeted at those countries that have not yet en-
acted a competition law. The idea is that “there is no one size fits all competition law” 
and that “competition policy is not a stand alone policy” (Cuts 2003a, p. 9), rather coun-
try particularities necessitate a country-specific approach. Some particularities (as e.g. 
the country’s development levels, market structures, openness to trade, smallness, weak 
competition culture, histories of state intervention, and the necessity of capacity build-
ing) suggest that not all provisions of a typical competition law of a mature market 
economy may be relevant or effective and that some may even contradict other policy 
priorities and developmental needs. Examples for country-specific rules include e.g. the 
case of South Africa, where the competition law contains special rules to overcome eco-
nomic segregation from the former ‘apartheid regime’ (Hartzenberg 2004, p. 207), and 
examples for typical exclusions with a view on developmental priorities include regu-
lated sectors, strategic sectors, cooperations to foster technological development, inno-
vations  and  standardisation,  agriculture,  small  and  medium  sized  enterprises,  and 
sports.4 Further country-specific rules that the EU suggested to consider under the cate-
gory of the flexibility concept include a focus on hard-core cartels (with less importance 
given to issues like the wider range of cartels, abuses of dominant position, monopolisa-
tion and merger control), sectoral exclusions but not regional approaches as substitutes, 
and in terms of institutionalisation of competition law, the possibility either to enforce 
by way of judicial means or administrative institutions (dedicated or agency with also 
other tasks), or both (WTO 2003). 
It should be noted that both developed and developing countries use exclusions in their 
national competition legislation (see e.g. EU’s block exemptions) and that this may not 
necessarily mean a weakening of competition law enforcement, rather they can be used 
to better target and design competition law and policies and to ensure legal certainty 
where the law leaves room for interpretation (Khemani 2002, p. 2; OECD 2003b, p. 3). 
However, this concept also contains dangers, and in order to contain those, the EU sug-
gests that three “principles” should be met when considering flexibility: transparency, 
non-discrimination (here understood as having no interference with the way individual 
decisions are taken), and procedural fairness (possibility of a judicial review of adminis-
trative decisions) (WTO 2003, for a discussion of these issues, see also Evenett and 
Clarke 2003, p. 102-108). 
                                                 
3  In the following, we use the term exclusion. It should be noted that while the terms exemption and 
exclusion are often used as synonyms, exceptions have a slightly different meaning in the context of 
national legal systems. For more detailed information compare Khemani (2002) and WTO (2001c). 
4  Compare e.g. Khemani (2002) and OECD (2003b). Both studies provide examples of possible exclu-
sions. Additionally, for readers interested in this issue, Khemani (2002) discusses the main rationales 
behind exclusions.  
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The concept of progressivity in the trade and competition context addresses the time 
dimension and is considerate of the fact that the development of institutions is a gradual 
process  (OECD  2003a,  p.  18).  It permits a gradual and selective implementation or 
deepening of measures against anti-competitive behaviour (WTO 2001b, p. 11). The 
idea is that a country without a competition regime or that does not effectively enforce 
its existing competition law may need time, and that a stepwise implementation may be 
more favourable in the context of a lack of experience5, competition culture, and scare 
resources. Implementation may be seen as an evolutionary process, possibly starting 
with rules that are more important, easier to effectively enforce, or for which more ac-
ceptance can be expected from the public. By contrast, rules against collusion of multi-
ple firms (cartels) are often not required as urgently in developing and transition coun-
tries. Furthermore, countries at least during the earlier stages of competition supervision, 
may want to shy away from dealing with the more time consuming and resource inten-
sive issues of merger regulation (Kronthaler et al. 2005, p. 4). In the words of the EU, 
the  concept  should  “allow  reasonable  and  more  individualised  time-periods  within 
which to adopt a domestic (or regional) competition law and establish an enforcement 
authority [...] according to the level of development, as well as to the wishes and needs 
of each country” (WTO 2003). This concept here is hence not only targeted at countries 
that have not yet enacted a competition law but also for those who still remain to effec-
tively enforce. 
The concept of progressivity is not a disputed issue by WTO members, rather, there 
seems to be a general agreement among WTO members that there is a need for granting 
trade agreement members (and possibly within a multilateral framework for competition 
policy) some extent of progressivity and individualised time-periods when adopting and 
implementing a competition law (OECD 2004, p. 12). The EU suggests in particular that 
countries without competition provisions might well be in the position to start with a 
ban on hard core cartels, regional approaches, and a judicial implementation by way of 
private actions by affected competitors before gradually increasing the depth and scope 
of its competition regime (WTO 2003). As is the case with flexibility, progressivity in 
establishing a competition regime also contains dangers, here the so-called ‘implementa-
tion backloading’, which as the EU suggests, can be contained by way of an indicative 
implementation plan (ibid.). 
In that the time needed for a smooth adaptation path towards a fully-fledged and worka-
ble competition regime may significantly depend on the amount and time-frame of fi-
                                                 
5  This includes two different aspects: first, “The greater the number of objectives or constraints that a 
competition authority is required to take into consideration, the higher the likelihood that the focus of 
enforcement efforts will not centre primarily on safeguarding the competitive process.” (Hoekman 
and Holmes 1999, p. 884). Second, individuals and institutions involved in the process of developing 
a competition regime may need time to “ride the learning curve” (WTO 2001d, p. 2).  
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nancial and technical assistance received, the concept of progressivity is closely related 
to technical and financial assistance and capacity building. 
2.2  Of particular interest: consistency and the concepts of progres-
sivity and flexibility 
When establishing a national competition law and enforcement system, a country will 
have to consider consistency of the new laws and regulations both with existing institu-
tional arrangements and within the new system. Whilst it is certainly true that, for less 
developed or least developed countries, enacting and enforcing a fully-fletched competi-
tion regime will place an onerous burden, and that flexibility and progressivity are con-
cepts that can make it easier for those countries, it is also true that the benefits of estab-
lishing a competition regime crucially depend on how well it is designed and integrated 
into the existing institutional fabric of the country involved. 
Hence, there are mainly two important considerations: first, in particular flexibility al-
lows countries to design a regime that is compatible with the existing national structures 
and peculiarities in general. This we may see exemplified not only in the case of South 
Africa of the three countries assessed here, but in many other cases as well; here, we re-
fer to the very difficult and time-consuming nature of the ‘translation’ of the competi-
tion-related chapters of the acquis communautaire into national law in the case of EU 
accession countries - this despite the fact that those countries’ institutional fabric was 
built more or less from scratch and less than a decade before. Second, applying either or 
both a flexible and a progressive approach to the establishment of a competition regime 
gives rise to the typical problem of inner consistency within the new regulations and in-
stitutions: the progressivity and flexibility approaches should not be misconceived as a 
menu to freely choose from according to own gusto6. Consider for example the en-
forcement of exclusively a ban on hard-core cartels without regulations concerning con-
centrations or merger control: this solution would all too easily give rise to adverse in-
centives by interfering in a discriminatory way with how individual decisions on behalf 
of enterprises are taken. Other examples include e.g. regional agreements without a na-
tional pendant, or a sectoral approach to exemptions and its sectoral reallocation effects. 
Those examples should make clear that flexibility and progressivity may assist countries 
in the process of enacting and more effectively enforcing, they may additionally provide 
possibilities to tie national particularities and policy priorities into the venture of estab-
lishing a competition regime, but also that those concepts give rise to the danger of re-
sulting in inconsistency. 
                                                 
6  For a negative example, see e.g. the communication by Trinidad and Tobago to the WTO Working Group 
on the Interaction between Trade and Competition Policy Competition Policy (WTO 2001d, p. 1).  
IWH  _________________________________________________________________ 
 
IWH-Diskussionspapiere 6/2006  12
2.3  Technical and financial assistance, capacity building 
Technical assistance and capacity building are often used in exchangeable connotations 
when  referring  to  assistance  in  considering,  drafting,  and  implementing  competition 
laws and other laws directly relevant to market competition (OECD 2002, p. 6). How-
ever, the terms have somewhat different meanings: capacity building refers to the more 
general process of implementing sustainable competition policy processes and frame-
works at the national and regional level, whereas technical assistance refers to the trans-
fer of skills and know how from organisations like WTO, UNCTAD, OECD and com-
petition agencies to agencies and jurisdictions in need of support for implementing sus-
tainable competition policies (ICN 2003, p. 46). In the following, we focus on the con-
cept of technical assistance. 
The main task of technical assistance is “to increase a beneficiary’s ability to consider 
the desirability of adopting some form of competition law or policy, and to draft, enact, 
and implement a law or policy that is tailored to its particular needs” (OECD 2002, p. 
6). General categories of technical assistance needed by beneficiaries are (i) legislative 
assistance, including the assessment of the desirability of a competition law, the drafting 
and amending of such a law, (ii) institutional and operational issues, including the build-
ing of a competition agency, the design and process of investigations, and the relation-
ships to other government and non-government institutions, and (iii) law enforcement 
assistance (OECD 2002, p. 7). 
In the discussion over technical and financial assistance, three major steps are identified 
to build an effective competition regime: first to create a competition culture, second to 
remediate institutional impediments and distortions, and third to build a regime which 
effectively deals with private anti-competitive conduct (OECD 2004, p. 13). Those steps 
respond to the fact that developing and transition countries often start the implementa-
tion of their competition legislation under unfavourable conditions that include scarce 
resources, a lack of professional expertise, inadequate jurisprudence, weak academic in-
frastructure, weak professional associations and consumer groups, excessive bureauc-
racy,  high  corruption,  and  possibly  political  and  bureaucratic  resistance  to  reform 
(CUTS 2003b, p. 1). 
Instruments of technical assistance used by donors to assist countries in implementing 
an effective competition regime are (i) conferences and seminars, where experts discuss 
best practices, (ii) internship programmes, where competition agency staff from devel-
oping countries have the opportunity to work in more experienced competition agencies, 
(iii) long-term advisors, where experienced competition agency staff support the compe-
tition agency staff in less experienced agencies, (iv) short term interventions by experi-
enced advisors in specific cases and problems, (v) publications, in which the benefits of  
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competition and the economic situation of a country is discussed, and (vi) assistance in 
the drafting of a competition legislation (ICN 2003, pp. 47-52, ICN 2005, p. 2).7 
In general, developing and transition countries seem to be content with all types of tech-
nical assistance provided (ICN 2003, p. 56 and ICN 2005, p. 30). In this respect a study 
by UNCTAD suggests that there exists no general agreement that one form of technical 
assistance is more useful than another and that the type of technical assistance used 
should be based on a needs assessment (UNCTAD 2004, p. 1). However, the results of 
several other studies indicate that some forms of technical assistance might be more im-
portant than others: in particular in a study by OECD, it is suggested that amongst the 
instruments of technical assistance, conferences, seminars, internship programmes, and 
long-term advisors are the programmes which received the most attention by beneficiar-
ies (OECD 2002, p. 8). Whilst a more recent study by ICN supports this view, this study 
also suggests that national and regional seminars, internship programmes, and long term 
advisors may have had the highest impact on the effectiveness of a competition agency 
(ICN 2005, pp. 36-37). 
The opinion voiced about which form of technical assistance is most beneficial addi-
tionally seems to differ between the agency heads and the agency staff participating in 
technical  assistance  programmes.  Whilst  agency heads  seem  to  favour  assistance  by 
procurement of e.g. high budget items, short term interventions, and conferences and 
seminars,  agency  staff  find  that  seminars,  long-term  advisors,  and  internship  pro-
grammes where most effective8 (ICN 2005, pp. 15-17). Furthermore, it is suggested that 
the type of technical assistance favoured depends on budget constraints: competition 
agencies  with  stronger  budget  constraints  place  more  emphasis  on  procurement  and 
seminars, whereas agencies with lesser budget constraints place more importance on as-
sistance that transfer knowledge (ICN 2005, pp. 18-19). Another issue raised, concerns 
the maturity of an agency which may influence the type of assistance needed (ICN 2005, 
p. 48). In this respect, a study by CUTS holds that within the suggested four stages of 
institutional  development  of  competition  regimes,  the  respective appropriate interna-
tional cooperation matters change (compare table 1). In the first two stages, international 
cooperation should focus on drafting, training, and procedures in line with the due proc-
ess, and in the third stage, when the implementation is well on track, cooperation in se-
lected cases is more appropriate (CUTS 2003b, pp.2-3). 
                                                 
7  All of these instruments have their own advantages and disadvantages. For a discussion of the pros 
and cons of these instruments, see e.g. OECD 2002. 
8  However, in the study it is suggested that further research is necessary to determine which type of as-
sistance is most beneficial (ICN 2005, p. 46).  
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Table 1: 
Stages of Institutional Development of Competition Regimes and International Coopera-
tion Matters 
Stages of Institutional Development 




2. Control of horizontal 
restraints 
+ 




4. Merger control 
+ 
5. Control of vertical 
restraints 
+ 







8. Proactive competition 
advocacy 
International cooperation matters: * 
Training and drafting of legislations and proce-
dures in line with due process 
Cooperation in selected 
cases with exchange of 
public information 
Systematic cooperation 
with exchange of confi-
dential information 
Note: * Whilst the measures described from stage I to III could be regarded as technical assistance in the sense of as-
sistance provided to develop a well functioning competition system, the point described in stage IV may be regarded 
as not constituting assistance in this sense. 
Source:  CUTS 2003b, pp. 2-3, modified. 
A further result of the examination by ICN suggests that not only the type of assistance 
decides about the success of the technical assistance programme9 provided, but also the 
competence  of  advisors,  the  quality  of  their  teaching  materials,  and  their  ability  to 
teach.10 Moreover, the study indicates that the involvement of the beneficiaries in the 
design and the content of a technical assistance programme is a key determinant of the 
success of the project (ICN 2005, pp. 21-46). In this regard, a study by UNCTAD rec-
ommends that “the most effective form of capacity building and technical assistance ac-
tivities are those which are integrated in the recipient country development strategy” 
(UNCTAD 2004, p. 1). 
                                                 
9  A technical assistance programme can include one or more types of technical assistance activities. 
10  In this regard it is interesting to note that the advisors’ familiarity with local particularities seems to 
be of relatively low importance (ICN 2005, p. 18 and 30).   
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3  Lessons drawn from experiences made in three case coun-
tries for other developing countries 
Before considering the role of gradual approaches for the development of a comprehen-
sive and effective competition regime within the three countries of South Africa, Po-
land, and Ukraine, it is important to bear in mind that those countries are at different 
stages in the process of implementing an effective competition regime. As indicators of 
the effectiveness of competition regimes show (compare table 2), none of the countries 
have reached the highest level of an effective competition regime. However, in particu-
lar South Africa seems to be well on track with substantial progress in the last years, 
whereas especially in Ukraine, little progress is observable. 
Table 2: 
Competition Policy Enforcement 




Indicator  2000  2001  2002  2003  2004 
Poland  2000  EBRD
2  3  3  3  3  3 
    WCR
3  3.6  -  3.6  -  3.3 
South Africa  1998  EBRD
2  -  -  -  -  - 
    WCR
3  4.7  4.8  4.9  -  5.3 
Ukraine  2001  EBRD
2  2+  2+  2+  2+  2+ 
    WCR
3  3.3  3.3  3.0  -  3.2 
Note:
 1 The year correspond to the adoption of the actual competition law in force. - 
2  EBRD Competition Policy In-
dicator: ranked between 1 and 4+, 1 indicates that in the specific country exists no competition legislation and institu-
tion, 4+ indicates that the standards are equal to those of typical advanced economies. – 
3  WCR Effectiveness of An-
titrust Policy Indicator: ranked between 1 and 7; 1 indicates that anti-monopoly policy in the country is lax and not 
effective at promoting competition, 7 indicates that it effectively promotes competition. 
Sources: IWH Database on Competition Law Enactment in Developing and Transition Countries; Euro-
pean Bank for Reconstruction and Development Transition Reports 2000-2004, World Competi-
tiveness Report, published annually by World Economic Forum, various issues.  
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3.1  The role of flexibility and progressivity in South Africa, Poland, 
and Ukraine 
The following chapters assess by use of case study material the role that flexibility and 
progressivity played for the timely development of comprehensive and effective compe-
tition regimes in South Africa, Poland, and Ukraine. 
3.1.1  The case of South Africa 
One important aspect before considering the implementation of the competition regime 
in South Africa in relation to progressivity and flexibility is that compared to many other 
developing and transition countries, South Africa has a long market economy tradition. 
Furthermore, its institutional setup is much more developed than that of many other de-
veloping and transition countries (Török 2005, p. 4). Compared to other developing and 
transition countries, the issue to develop an effective competition regime is therefore in 
many respects much less complex because workable institutions were always available. 
South Africa has, as a former British dominion, a long tradition in competition legisla-
tion.11 The first competition legislation was introduced in 1955 and was about 20 years 
in force. This law, however, has never been effectively enforced due to several inade-
quacies and the existing economic system governed by the state and a few influential in-
dustrial families.12 In particular, only certain ‘monopolistic conditions’ were defined, 
per se prohibition did not exist, the executive arm was not independent from the gov-
ernment, and sanctions and remedies were ineffective and weak (Török 2005, p. 7-8). 
Furthermore, considering that the executive arm of the law was the Board of Trade and 
Industries (BTI), the close relationship between the government and the influential in-
dustrial families was not conducive to properly enforce the law. 
The existing weaknesses of the 1955 competition law, in particular the weak enforce-
ment system and the inability in dealing with mergers, led to an overhaul of the law in 
the seventies. An inquiry commission was established by the government in 1975 which 
recommend a complete reorganisation of the existing institutional settings. A ‘tripartite’ 
system was suggested, consisting of a supervising Ministry, a body for investigation and 
enforcement, and an independent competition tribunal (Török 2005, p. 8). However, 
only a few suggestions of the inquiry commission were implemented by the government 
in the 1979 ‘Maintenance and Promotion of Competition Act’. Merger control was ex-
plicitly included in the law, and ‘monopoly situations’ were also defined. Furthermore, 
with the creation of a competition board, one part of the suggested ‘tripartite’ system 
                                                 
11  However, compared to other former British colonies an explicit competition law was relatively late 
introduced (Török 2005, p. 7). 
12  Only 18 investigations into uncompetitive behaviour have been carried out during the existence of 
the law (Török 2005, p. 7).  
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was established. However, several shortcomings remained. In particular, explicit prohi-
bitions were not an integral part of the law, the benchmark for assessing the harm of 
anti-competitive behaviour was ‘public interest’ which is widely regarded as inadequate 
for this issue13, the competition board was subordinated to the government, and an in-
dependent competition tribunal was not created (the executive power remained by the 
government) (Török 2005, p. 8-10). 
In  general,  assessing  the  established  competition  regime  until  1994  (when  an  ANC 
dominated government came into force), two major shortcomings could be identified. 
First, the content and the design of the competition legislation makes it difficult to in-
vestigate  anti-competitive  behaviour.  Second,  the  institutional  settings,  explicitly  the 
lack of political independence of the competition institutions, was created in such a way 
that the law “could be used rather by than against the government” to protect “the eco-
nomic interests of the ruling political elite [...] Its overhaul became thus a political ne-
cessity after the change of political regime” (Török 2005, p. 10). 
Four years after the change of the political regime, with a prehistory of about six years, a 
completely new competition legislation came into force: the Competition Act of 1998 
(Török 2005, p. 22), which is widely recognised as a modern, state-of-the-art competi-
tion legislation (Török 2005, p. 40). 
Maybe one of the most important features in regard to progressivity could be seen in the 
process of drafting the new legislation. The process started in 1992 with a policy docu-
ment by ANC which includes elements of competition policy. Emphasis was laid espe-
cially on the role of competition policy in “correcting the concentration of economic 
power, and in lowering the level of economic domination by a minority within the white 
minority” (Török 2005, p. 22). However, the objectives changed in the following years: 
correcting  historically  developed  economic  structures  became  less  important,  whilst 
promoting competition within the domestic market (including the promotion of small 
and medium sized firms) and the control of anti-competitive conduct came to the fore 
(Török 2005, p. 23). This could be understood in the necessity to restructure the econ-
omy in such a way that historically disadvantaged people (mainly blacks) are able to 
successfully take part in economy activity, whilst economic development should not be 
hampered due to uncertainty about property rights. To solve this task and to ensure eco-
nomic and political stability, the necessity was seen to mobilise the whole society to 
support such a law (Török 2005, p. 23). Steps in this process included to convince the 
society that the old law has to be replaced due to its shortcomings, and more importantly 
to include all different groups interested in the law in the drafting process (Török 2005, 
                                                 
13  In contrast to ‘consumer welfare’ or ‘social welfare’, there is no economic measure to quantify ‘pub-
lic interest’, as it is not a pre-defined term and therefore open to many interpretations and individual 
interests (compare e.g. Kirchner 2004, p. 311, Motta 2004, p. 12).  
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p. 24).14 Hence, the South African process of developing an significantly overhauled 
competition regime may be best described as a ‘bottom-up approach’. 
With respect to progressivity another issue is remarkable. In contrast to the often raised 
issue that merger regulation is a complex issue and may therefore not be enforced  dur-
ing the earlier stages of competition supervision, merger regulation is an important part 
from the beginning of the implementation of the 1998 Competition Act in South Africa. 
As a matter of fact, “the implementation of the 1998 Competition Act has been biased 
towards mergers” (Török 2005, p. 30). In this respect, a contribution from South Africa 
to the OECD Global Fora stated that “merger investigation and analysis has proved to 
be a powerful source of learning for the competition authorities” (Competition Tribunal 
of South Africa and Competition Commission of South Africa 2004, p. 2), that merger 
investigation is an important advocacy instrument and is important to ensure the com-
petitive structure of markets (ibid, p. 3). This could be understood in particular in view 
of the highly concentrated market structure in South Africa which makes merger regula-
tion an important issue within the country. 
With respect to flexibility, the most important features of the South African competition 
law is that it went far beyond the scope of a typical competition law in mature countries 
in some important and clearly country-specific respects (compare Box 1): “The reasons 
of these differences can be linked to the strategic task of finding an optimal combination 
between the promotion of competition and development. The promotion of competition 
also helps development in a long-term approach, but the short-term requirements of 
finding the adequate balance between them may have a strong country-specific charac-
ter. An interesting case of how this balance is being sought is South Africa” (Török 
2005, p. 4). 
                                                 
14  “This broad scope of competition policy objectives met considerable discussion and criticism during 
the preparatory works of the law. It has to be seen, however, that the still quite fragile political and 
economic stability of South Africa made it necessary to prepare a competition law open to the great-
est possible part of the business community and the society. The broad formulation of these policy 
objectives can be regarded as necessary for obtaining really wide political support for the law which 
was rightly regarded as one of the most important prerequisites for putting South Africa on a track of 
transition to becoming a modern market economy.” (Török 2005, p. 26).  
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Box 1: 
Objectives of the South African Competition Act of 1998 
“The purpose of this Act is to promote and maintain competition in the Republic in or-
der: 
(a)  to promote the efficiency, adaptability and development of the economy; 
(b)  to provide consumers with competitive prices and product choices; 
(c)  to promote employment and advance the social and economic welfare of South Afri-
cans; 
(d)  to expand opportunities for South African participation in world markets and to rec-
ognise the role of foreign competition in the Republic; 
(e)  to ensure that small and medium-sized enterprises have an equitable opportunity to 
participate in the economy; and 
(f)  to promote a greater spread of ownership, in particular to increase the ownership 
stakes of historically disadvantaged persons.” 
Source:  CUTS 2002, p. 22. 
Only the objectives (b) and (d) of the law described in Box 1 are directly linked to com-
petition issues, all other objectives are rather specific to the particularities of the South 
African economy and society. Objective (a) and (c) are more general economic objec-
tives. However, they are of particular interest with a view on economic and political sta-
bility of South Africa. Objective (f) is concerned with the issue to increase the participa-
tion of historically disadvantaged persons (mainly blacks). This aim has a strong politi-
cal background within South Africa and is also supported by the Black Economic Em-
powerment  (BEE)  strategy  of  the  government.  Objective  (e),  although  protection  of 
small and medium-sized enterprise has a long international tradition within competition 
legislation, has a specific South African component, as many of the small and medium-
sized enterprises are owned by historically disadvantaged people.15 
With respect to flexibility, it is furthermore worth noting that, compared to other compe-
tition legislation e.g. in the EU, South Africa has no block exemptions. However, e-
xemptions can be granted on request. This possibility was designed to allow for strategic 
objectives like export promotion, promotion of small businesses, to prevent the decline 
of an industry, and to improve the competitiveness of firms owned by historically disad-
vantage persons (Török 2005, p. 30). 
                                                 
15  “In fact, the playing field tilted in favour of certain groups of Whites had to be levelled in order to 
create  markets  with  more  or  less  equal  chances  for  entrepreneurs  belonging  to  different  ethnic 
groups.” (Török 2005, p. 10-11).  
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3.1.2  The case of Poland 
In contrast to South Africa, the circumstances under which a competition legislation had 
to be established in Poland during and following the shift from a central planning sys-
tem to a competitive market orientated economy were completely different. In particular 
not only a competition legislation had to be established but also all adjunct legislation, 
like most importantly a company law, as well as economic and democratic institutions. 
Post second World War, Poland adopted its first competition legislation in 198716: the 
‘Act  on  Combating  Monopolistic  Practices  in  the  National  Economy’.17 This corre-
sponded to the Polish strategy from the early 1980s to modify the central planning sys-
tem by introducing some selected market mechanisms.18 The drafting of the 1987 legis-
lation started in 1982. It was mentioned as one of the free market mechanisms and as an 
instrument to control Polish enterprises, some of which at that time exhibited monopo-
listic practices with respect to price-setting (Cylwik et al. 2005, p. 19).19 Whilst the list 
of prohibited practices in the Polish act were to some extent similar to those typically 
found in mature market economies, important differences existed which made the law 
largely ineffective: nearly all state-owned enterprises were excluded from the law and 
the anti-monopoly authority was closely tied to political control (Cylwik et al. 2005, p. 
19-20).  However,  although  the  competition  legislation  was  ill-designed  and  insuffi-
ciently  implemented,  the  country  was  able  to  accumulate  some  experiences  which 
proved useful for the preparation of a new act in 1990 (Cylwik et al. 2005, p. 29). 
The systemic transformation, which may be considered to have taken off in 1989, in-
cluded some aspects that are relevant to competition: the abolishment of the central 
planning  system,  privatisation  of  state-owned  companies,  de-regulation  of  amongst 
other things prices, liberalisation of most importantly domestic and foreign trade, i.e. the 
creation of internal and some extent of external competition by ensuring freedom of 
economic activity. In the course of the Polish transition process, the 1990 ‘Act on Com-
bating Monopolist Practices’ was enacted with its main objectives to ensure the devel-
opment of competition, to prevent monopolistic practices, and to protect consumer in-
                                                 
16  In fact, this is somewhat puzzling: an economic system governed by a plan is not only coherent with-
out the criterion of competition, rather competition can be considered an inconsistency in this system: 
neither consumers nor companies are free to plan their own economic activity. In all countries with a 
planned economic system, however, markets did exist, and some freedom in economic activity was 
granted to agents. 
17  Not accounting for the Act on Cartels of 1933 and the Antimonopoly Act of 1939. 
18  However, during this period only cosmetic changes of the central planning system happened. Pro-
found market mechanisms were only established in the late 1980s (Cylwik et al. 2005, p. 15-17). 
19  In the 1970s the price system was de-centralised and governed by the associations of undertakings 
(Cylwik et al. 2005, p. 11). Socialist economic policies favoured vertical integration and the resulting 
state-created monopolies and their behaviour exemplifies the inconsistency of mixing criteria from 
opposing economic systems.  
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terests (Cylwik et al. 2005, p. 47). In terms of institutional development, this enactment 
was flanked by the establishment of an politically independent Anti-Monopoly Office 
with significant investigation competences and the right to comment on restructuring, 
deregulation, and privatization programmes. Furthermore, an Anti-Monopoly Court was 
established that was attached to Voivodship Civil Court in Warsaw and served as an ap-
peal court (Cylwik et al. 2005, p. 48 and 54-55). 
With respect to progressivity, it is of particular interest that the implementation of the 
law first focused on the removal of the causes of monopolistic practices, as this seemed 
to be more important for an economy in transition than combating anti-competitive con-
duct. In fact, in the first years of its existence, the Anti-Monopoly Office was mainly 
concerned with the development of competition and not with its protection: e.g. it was 
concerned with the changing of the ownership structure, the conditions necessary for 
developing new enterprises, and the restructuring of existing monopolies. Of particular 
importance was also the control of prices, as many markets had monopolistic structures  
(Cylwik et al. 2005, p. 66-68). However, in due course with the restructuring of these 
markets, the control of prices soon became less important and today this issue is of mi-
nor relevance (Cylwik et al. 2005, p. 79). Furthermore, many efforts were invested to es-
tablish the law within the society, the most important features of which were to build a 
positive competition culture and to inform the public about the functioning of the act 
(Cylwik et al. 2005, p. 71). 
The issue of flexibility in the drafting and the process of enactment seemed to have been 
of less relevance - the law allowed little exemptions including only intellectual property 
rights, agreements in regard to employee rights, and rights from copyright law (Cylwik 
et al. 2005, p. 51). In 1995, the ‘Act on Combating Monopolist Practices’ was signifi-
cantly amended. Most importantly, thresholds were established below which a merger 
was not subject to notification (de minimis), prior to this amendment, all mergers were 
controlled by the Anti-Monopoly Office. Furthermore, the list of conducts that were 
considered to fulfil the criterion of ‘abuse of dominant position’ was extended and a de 
minimis rule was introduced (Cylwik et al. 2005, p. 56). Two main incentives initiated 
this amendment. First, the law had to be adapted to the changes in the Polish economic 
environment following the first five years of systemic transition and economic catch-up 
development, and second the law had to meet the OECD requirements and had to be 
harmonised with the EU legislation as set out in the acquis communautaire with a view 
on EU membership (Cylwik et al. 2005, p. 56). 
In 2000, yet again, the Polish competition legislation was amended: the ‘Act on Compe-
tition and Consumer Protection’ replaced the former ‘Act on Combating Monopolist 
Practices’ and the ‘Act on Conditions of Admissibility and Monitoring of State Aid 
granted to Undertakings’ was added. Whilst the adoption of the ‘Act on Competition 
and  Consumer  Protection’  does  not  provide  significant  new  insights  with respect to 
flexibility and progressivity, the adoption of the ‘Act on Conditions of Admissibility and  
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Monitoring of State Aid granted to Undertakings’ is of more interest with respect to 
both issues: this act has four main objectives, including (i) ensuring transparency of the 
usage of state funds, (ii) defining the permitted share of state funds by financing invest-
ments, (iii) assessing the impact of state funds, and (iv) assessing the impact of state aid 
with regard to competition (Cylwik et al. 2005, p. 60).20 It took over 8 years until the 
Act was finally adopted. The need to regulate state aid with respect to competition was 
defined already in the EU agreement from 1992, where in Article 63 it was stated that 
“any public aid which distorts or threatens to distort competition […] is incompatible 
with the proper functioning of the Agreement” (Cylwik et al. 2005, p. 61-62) and that 
transparency in regard to state aid is necessary. Poland, however, did not fulfil its obli-
gations in this respect until the 2000 Act come into force. The reason for this was espe-
cially that state aid had a higher political priority in the transition process than the possi-
bly  negative  impact  on  competition.  Even  by  the  time  that  systemic  transformation 
could be considered almost complete, state aid remained an issue of controversial de-
bate, as the discussion about the Act within the Polish parliament shows (compare Cyl-
wik et al. 2005, p. 62-66). Assessing this from the point of view of the role of progres-
sivity and flexibility for Polish competition law enactment, it could be argued that this 
process may have been seriously hampered if state aid would have been placed on the 
agenda right from the outset of the process in 1982 or 1990. 
3.1.3  The case of Ukraine 
Similarly to Poland, the evolution of competition legislation in Ukraine is closely linked 
to the transformation process. Here, however, additionally to the foundation of the state 
of Ukraine21. Decisions had to be taken about the characteristics of the political and 
economic systems, and all political and economic institutions had to be established from 
scratch. In this regard, it is important to bear in mind that the transition process from a 
state command system to a free market system in Ukraine has not been smooth and was 
time-consuming: nearly a whole decade passed until the state-owned sector was priva-
tised  to  a  substantial  extent,  until  significant  economic  freedom  was  achieved,  and 
sound  macroeconomic  policies  were  applied.  All  these  issues  affected  seriously  the 
process of implementing an effective competition policy in the Ukraine. In particular, 
during the first years of the transformation process, the conception of principles and 
foundations of a free market system was insufficient amongst political elites. Due to this 
and due to severe economic problems, steps towards reforms were accompanied by sub-
sequent steps backwards (Jakubiak 2005, p. 4-6). 
In Ukraine, the first competition legislation was adopted in 1992: the ‘Law on Limita-
tion of Monopolism and Prevention of Unfair Competition in Entrepreneurial Activi-
                                                 
20  In effect, this Act is targeted mainly at EU regional policy. 
21  The country declared its independence in December 1991 from the Soviet Union.  
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ties’. This law seems to be of particular importance in Ukraine, as the central planned 
economy resulted in a situation where especially large state-owned enterprises domi-
nated the economy. Conduct prohibited by the law include the abuse of dominant posi-
tion, anti-competitive concerted actions, and discrimination of economic entities by cen-
tral and local state bodies (Jakubiak 2005, p. 16-17). However, exemptions were al-
lowed in order to ensure national security, defence, and other public interests (Jakubiak 
2005, p. 18). In the law, it was furthermore specified that anti-monopoly control should 
be conducted by an Anti-Monopoly Committee. This committee was defined one year 
later by the ‘Law on the Anti-Monopoly Committee of Ukraine’ in 1993. The basic 
tasks of the Antimonopoly Committee of Ukraine (AMCU) were (i) the control over the 
observance of the anti-monopoly legislation, (ii) the protection of legitimate interests of 
entrepreneurs and consumers in relation to the anti-monopoly legislation, and (iii) to de-
velop fair competition within the economy (Jakubiak 2005, p. 19). In terms of institu-
tional setting, the AMCU was clearly dependent on the Ukrainian president and gov-
ernment (note that the position of the president in Ukraine is very strong). In 1996, a 
major amendment took place with the enactment of the ‘Law on Protection against Un-
fair Competition’. It replaced norms of the 1992 law that relate to unfair competition 
(Jakubiak 2005, p. 20) and was aimed at strengthening the powers of AMCU, because in 
the absence of well functioning judiciary system, AMCU was the only body able to pro-
tect unfair competition (Stotyka, 2004, p. 13). Yet, the issue of political dependence 
seems to even have worsened. With this reformed law, the first phase of implementing 
competition legislation was completed which could be regarded as an important step in 
gaining experience with key principles of competition, and implementing competition 
legislation. However, it became increasingly obvious that the design of the law as well 
as the institutional setting were not conducive to the development and protection of 
competition in the Ukraine economy. Furthermore, the particularly slow speed of other 
market based reforms added to the problems: we know experience that a competition 
law is not a stand alone policy but is rather highly dependent on the speed of market-
related institution-building, and those were beyond the influence of AMCU (apart from 
their right to recommend on reforms). 
Those shortcomings prompted AMCU already in 1996, the year in which the major 
amendment came into force, to start an initiative to design a new law that enables the in-
stitutions to better concentrate and fulfil its obligations to develop and ensure competi-
tion (Jakubiak 2005, p. 29). The intention was to reform the national legislation with the 
help of international experience and to strengthen AMCU in its task to create a competi-
tive environment in Ukraine. Already one year later, a draft legislation was presented. 
This draft was prepared with international expertise and was in line with the laws of 
OECD member countries, especially with those of the EU. In general, the law was con-
sidered a modern state-of-the-art competition legislation not only by AMCU but also 
from outside Ukraine (Jakubiak 2005, p. 29). However, it took about six years until this 
law  came  into  force.  The  ‘Law  on  the  Protection  of  Economic  Competition’  was 
adopted  in  2001  and  replaced the former anti-monopoly legislations in 2002. Major  
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changes  were,  in  particular,  a  clearer  definition  of  monopolistic  activities  and  a 
strengthening of the Anti-Monopoly Committee (Jakubiak 2005, p. 21). 
With respect to progressivity and flexibility it is of particular interest why it took around 
six years until this legislation came into force, especially as it could be considered as 
properly designed, on the basis of international experience. The main reason may lie 
with the interests of the powerful Ukrainian business groups which were closely linked 
to the government, some even as members of parliament. Those interest-groups success-
fully hampered the introduction of the new competition legislation, because they consid-
ered it as potentially harmful to their individual interests (Jakubiak 2005, p. 29-30).22 
Only after it became impossible to refuse the law due to the re-opening of Ukraine after 
the financial crisis of 1998 (e.g. Cooperation Agreement between EU and Ukraine) and 
indirectly also due to membership-negotiations with the WTO, the law was finally able 
to pass the parliament (Jakubiak 2005, p. 30). However, the scope of possible exemp-
tions from the 2001 Competition Law is considerable and includes in particular, prac-
tices that stimulate manufacturing, technological development, economic development, 
and small and medium enterprises. What is even more, the exemptions are open to in-
terpretation: the Cabinet of Ministers can allow concerted actions which result in ‘posi-
tive social effects’. Neither the term ‘positive social effects’ is exactly defined, nor the 
necessary investigations to determine ‘positive social effects’ (Jakubiak 2005, p. 24). 
Assessing this with respect to using flexibility as a means to facilitate the drafting and 
adoption of a competition law, the path that the Ukraine took contradicts its intention: 
rather  than  to  improve  legal  certainty  (as  suggested  by  Khemani  2002  and  OECD 
2003b), exemptions resulted in watering down the law. With respect to progressivity, it 
could be argued that it might have been better, if more time had been invested in the 
drafting process. Furthermore, it could have been preferential to actively involve all 
relevant interest groups into the process of drafting the law, not only international ex-
perience: this might have resulted in a much speeder process of adoption later-on, even 
though the drafting could have resulted in a much more weaker competition legislation. 
As we can see, even the ‘hard approach’ to the drafting process (by including foreign 
expertise and not considering national interest-groups to a substantial extent) resulted in 
a competition legislation with substantial and unclear exemptions. 
With respect to progressivity, another feature is of relevance: it seems to be the case that 
after 2001, the effectiveness of the AMCU increased. In particular, the investigation du-
ration decreased and the investigations seem to be better focused i.e. concentrated on 
                                                 
22  In this respect, Jakubiak stated that “[w]hile the laws are generally well drafted, on the basis of inter-
national experience, they can wait even for years in the Rada to be passed. The Competition Law of 
2001 and the Law on State Aid currently waiting in the parliament are such examples. The “average” 
speed of passing this type of legislation, which is potentially harmful to big Ukrainian businesses, has 
not changed much over the last years” (Jakubiak 2005, p. 15).  
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fewer  firms.  In  general,  the  regulatory  burden  inflicted  by  AMCU,  as  perceived  by 
Ukraine businesses, decreased after 2001 (Palianytsia 2004). Furthermore, price regula-
tion became less important from 1999: this could be due to the fact that markets became 
more competitive, or that AMCU focussed more on the causes of anti-competitive con-
duct. In the case of Ukraine, this could be regarded as a more effective strategy to ensure 
competition (Jakubiak 2005, p. 36). 
There are two possible reasons for the increased effectiveness of the AMCU. First, the 
law  which  came  into  force  in  2002  is  better  designed  than  its  predecessor  and  the 
AMCU gained more independence. Second, the experience of AMCU in conducting 
cases increased, which probably shows in the decreasing investigation duration. With 
respect to progressivity, these two reasons indicate that in Ukraine, effectiveness im-
proved with improved institutional setting for the competition agency and with its “rid-
ing the learning curve”. During the earlier years, it might have been more appropriate to 
invest more resources on competition advocacy and on the causes of anti-competitive 
conduct rather than focussing too much on resource-intensive investigations. 
3.2  Technical and financial assistance in the three case countries 
All three countries have benefited from numerous programmes and activities related to 
technical and financial assistance from a variety of different sources (see table 3). Al-
though of course a comparison of pure numbers of programmes and activities across 
those three countries is problematic (no further data was available that would have been 
comparable), all three countries enacted (or ventured a major overhaul of) their competi-
tion laws largely around the same time, and hence received the largest share of their 
technical assistance somewhere around 2000. We can hence assume that the design of 
those programmes and the philosophy behind them may have been sufficiently alike to 
warrant a comparison of programme numbers. 
In terms of substantive areas, assistance was geared by large most frequently to the area 
of competition policy in general, followed by assistance to the institutional structure of 
the competition agency, and to the techniques of investigation. No emphasis was placed 
on consumer protection (like e.g. deceptive advertising) and -apart from the Ukraine- to-
the harmonisation of competition law and the judiciary on the one side and the legisla-
tive on the other. The Ukraine is also the country with the largest number of assistance 
programmes amongst the three countries in the ICN list.  
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In terms of modes of assistance, the ICN inventory clearly shows that regional and na-
tional  workshops,  seminars  and  conferences  were  amongst the most frequently used 
types of assistance, followed by study missions or internships. Considering that those 
also form part of the list with probably the “highest impact” and with the “most atten-
tion by beneficiaries” in the assessments of the ICN and the OECD respectively, we can 
deduct that the assistance granted to the three countries was probably effective and well 
received. Despite the fact that in those assessments, in-country consultations by use of 
short-term advisors were considered to be less effective and also received less attention 
by the beneficiaries, this method was the third most frequently used one in the three case 
countries. Also, long-term advisors, being considered as effective and well received, 
have been clearly less frequently been used in our countries. Of virtually no importance 
were the use of academic studies conducted for the countries, either financed by the do-
nors or conducted by experts in the donor countries. Of only little importance were 
needs  assessment,  conducted  only  in  the  case  of  South  Africa,  despite  the  fact  that 
UNCTAD values this as particularly important (UNCTAD, 2004, p. 1). 
Across countries, assistance to the Ukraine was the most targeted at those methods of 
assistance identified as most effective and best received by the beneficiary with a clear 
bias on conferences or seminars and on internships, whilst Poland and South Africa 
placed more weight on probably less effective assistance e.g. by use of short-term advi-
sors (which corresponds to the above mentioned preference of heads of competition 
agencies vis-à-vis the preferences of staff).  
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4  Conclusions on the role of these concepts for developing 
countries 
The final chapter makes use of the discussion of lessons drawn from the experiences of 
the  three  case  countries with  progressivity,  flexibility,  technical, and financial assis-
tance. Those experiences may help to advance the establishment of effective competi-
tion regimes in developing country members of bilateral or multilateral trade agreements 
and to assess the role that those types of special and differential treatment can play in the 
potential development of a multilateral framework for competition policy. The analysis 
showed that in all three case countries, a rather progressive and flexible design of the in-
stitutional reform into a national competition law were of pivotal importance, although 
not in all countries, the experience was positive. Assistance likewise played some role in 
implementing competition regimes in those countries, and played particularly important 
positive role where due account was taken to national particularities. 
With respect to progressivity, the case studies indicate that sufficient time should be al-
lowed for the drafting process of competition legislations. Competition advocacy in this 
process is of uttermost importance, in particular in order to get broad support for the 
new law within the society. In this regard, furthermore, it seems to be useful to involve 
all relevant interest groups to get the highest possible acceptance within the society for 
the new law. In this sense, South Africa’s drafting process could be best described as 
‘bottom-up approach.’ Contrary to this, the ‘top-down approach’ carried out in Ukraine 
seems to be less favourable. A further result considering progressivity with regard to the 
enforcement process suggests that in the beginning of the enforcement phase competi-
tion advocacy is just as important, in particular to establish a competition culture and to 
inform the society about the functioning of the law. This pertains mainly to informing 
both enterprises and consumers about what behaviour is lawful or not, and about their 
individual rights. 
Moreover, the results suggest that progressivity in the implementation phase is strongly 
related to national particularities. E.g. whilst in South Africa, merger regulation was an 
important issue right from the time the law came into force, in Poland, however, the 
main task was to remove the causes of anti-competitive behaviour, e.g. building a com-
petition culture, reducing entry barriers, etc. This indicates that there is no general rule 
for progressivity in the enforcement phase (it is often suggested that merger regulation 
should not be an important task at the beginning, because merger regulation is complex 
and time consuming), i.e. progressivity has to be designed with a view on national par-
ticularities. In this respect, it seems favourable to make use of de minimis rules right 
from the beginning to ensure that the competition agency does not have to use all re-
sources for investigations but also retains some room for competition advocacy and for 
the learning curve. Over time, such use of de minimis rules (e.g. to focus on hard-core 
cartels as the EU suggests) can be reduced to an acceptable extent.  
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Considering flexibility, the results suggest that some flexibility is necessary to facilitate 
the introduction of a competition legislation. Two points seem to be important: first, it 
could be useful to broaden the scope of the competition legislation beyond the scope 
that a competition law would normally cover, in order to get broad support for the law 
within  the  society  and  to  consider  national  particularities  and  development  interests  
(e.g. South Africa). Second, it is maybe necessary to omit special issues and to allow for 
exemptions in order to facilitate the adoption of the legislation and to improve legal cer-
tainty  (e.g.  state  aid  in  Poland).  However,  as  the  case  of  Ukraine  shows,  flexibility 
should not be used to water down the applicability of the respective law through an un-
clear definition of exemptions with a lot of interpretation possibilities. 
Furthermore, with respect to the institutional setting, the experiences made by the case 
countries indicate that flexibility and progressivity should not be used here: an inde-
pendent investigation authority, an executive body, and the right to appeal against deci-
sions right from the beginning of the enforcement phase appears to be necessary for the 
establishment of a well functioning competition system. 
With respect to technical and financial assistance, programmes can indeed make a dif-
ference in terms of convincing countries to start their own processes of competition law 
implementation, and this pertains mainly to developing countries due to scarce resources 
and lack of expertise. Our case countries may not have been constrained in those terms 
as much as least developed countries, yet all the same, they made extensive use of such 
programmes.  This  indicates  that  even  for  more  developed  countries  assistance  pro-
grammes may be just as relevant.23 
In terms of a Multilateral Framework for Competition, the results indicate that some 
flexibility and progressivity may be beneficial for the development of a competition re-
gime - which in turn is a necessary yet insufficient condition for a Multilateral Frame-
work. Just as is often stated in other sources, our results also suggest that “there is no 
one size fits all competition law” (Cuts 2003a, p. 9). Whilst progressivity does not nec-
essarily contradict the possibility to build a Multilateral Framework, flexibility seems to 
be more problematic, especially as it seems to be the case that every country needs an 
different approach of flexibility. However, developing a competition regime with the 
support of both concepts could be regarded as an important first step in building a Mul-
tilateral Framework for Competition. Furthermore, as the case of Poland suggests, rules 
that were left aside at the beginning, can be adopted in a later phase (e.g. state aid regu-
lation). 
                                                 
23  Assessing the relative impacts of assistance programmes and instruments within case studies is sug-
gested by ICN to be less informative (ICN 2005, p. 46). Rather, future research could use econo-
metric analysis to determine relative impacts by way of regression analysis over a large set of count-
ries.  
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Whilst  suggesting  the  potential  usefulness  of  those  types  of  special  and  differential 
treatment for the development of an effective competition regime within trade-related 
agreements, our analysis does not infer sufficient general evidence as to what extent, 
eventually, such measures can be applied in particular other countries, and as to what 
mix of measures are most effective in particular other countries. This is due to the fact 
that the rationale for and the dangers involved with the application of flexibility and 
progressivity, as well as for technical assistance, root in the very country-specific par-
ticularities themselves. At this general level, however, our view of this issue is that ad-
herence to the three “principles” of transparency, non-discrimination, and procedural 
fairness is a necessary condition for special and differential treatment to deliver the 
beneficial effects as discussed here. This would hence exclude the application of special 
and differential treatment measures to either transparency or procedural fairness or both.  
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